As required by Section 595(c) of Title 28 of the UnitedStates Code, the Office of the Independent Counsel ("OIC" or"Office") hereby submits substantial and credible informationthat President William Jefferson Clinton committed acts that mayconstitute grounds for an impeachment.⁽¹⁾

The information reveals that President Clinton:

lied under oath at a civil deposition while he was adefendant in a sexual harassment lawsuit;

lied under oath to a grand jury;

attempted to influence the testimony of a potentialwitness who had direct knowledge of facts that wouldreveal the falsity of his deposition testimony;

attempted to obstruct justice by facilitating awitness's plan to refuse to comply with a subpoena;

attempted to obstruct justice by encouraging a witnessto file an affidavit that the President knew would befalse, and then by making use of that false affidavitat his own deposition;

lied to potential grand jury witnesses, knowing thatthey would repeat those lies before the grand jury; and

engaged in a pattern of conduct that was inconsistentwith his constitutional duty to faithfully execute thelaws.

The evidence shows that these acts, and others, were part of apattern that began as an effort to prevent the disclosure ofinformation about the President's relationship with a formerWhite House intern and employee, Monica S. Lewinsky, andcontinued as an effort to prevent the information from beingdisclosed in an ongoing criminal investigation.

In May 1994, Paula Corbin Jones filed a lawsuit againstWilliam Jefferson Clinton in the United States District Court forthe Eastern District of Arkansas.⁽²⁾ Ms. Jones alleged that whilehe was the Governor of Arkansas, President Clinton sexuallyharassed her during an incident in a Little Rock hotel room.⁽³⁾ President Clinton denied the allegations. He also challenged theability of a private litigant to pursue a lawsuit against asitting President. In May 1997, the Supreme Court unanimouslyrejected the President's legal argument. The Court concludedthat Ms. Jones, "[l]ike every other citizen who properly invokes[the District Court's] jurisdiction . . . has a right to anorderly disposition of her claims," and that therefore Ms. Joneswas entitled to pursue her claims while the President was inoffice.⁽⁴⁾ A few months later, the pretrial discovery processbegan.⁽⁵⁾

One sharply disputed issue in the Jones litigation was theextent to which the President would be required to discloseinformation about sexual relationships he may have had with"other women." Ms. Jones's attorneys sought disclosure of thisinformation, arguing that it was relevant to proving that thePresident had propositioned Ms. Jones. The President resistedthe discovery requests, arguing that evidence of relationshipswith other women (if any) was irrelevant.

In late 1997, the issue was presented to United StatesDistrict Judge Susan Webber Wright for resolution. JudgeWright's decision was unambiguous. For purposes of pretrialdiscovery, President Clinton was required to provide certaininformation about his alleged relationships with other women. Inan order dated December 11, 1997, for example, Judge Wright said: "The Court finds, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled toinformation regarding any individuals with whom the President hadsexual relations or proposed or sought to have sexual relationsand who were during the relevant time frame state or federalemployees."⁽⁶⁾ Judge Wright left for another day the issue whetherany information of this type would be admissible were the case togo to trial. But for purposes of answering the written questionsserved on the President, and for purposes of answering questionsat a deposition, the District Court ruled that the President mustrespond.

In mid-December 1997, the President answered one of thewritten discovery questions posed by Ms. Jones on this issue. When asked to identify all women who were state or federalemployees and with whom he had had "sexual relations" since1986,⁽⁷⁾ the President answered under oath: "None."⁽⁸⁾ For purposesof this interrogatory, the term "sexual relations" was notdefined.

On January 17, 1998, President Clinton was questioned underoath about his relationships with other women in the workplace,this time at a deposition. Judge Wright presided over thedeposition. The President was asked numerous questions about hisrelationship with Monica Lewinsky, by then a 24-year-old formerWhite House intern, White House employee, and Pentagon employee. Under oath and in the presence of Judge Wright, the Presidentdenied that he had engaged in a "sexual affair," a "sexualrelationship," or "sexual relations" with Ms. Lewinsky. ThePresident also stated that he had no specific memory of havingbeen alone with Ms. Lewinsky, that he remembered few details ofany gifts they might have exchanged, and indicated that no oneexcept his attorneys had kept him informed of Ms. Lewinsky'sstatus as a potential witness in the Jones case.

On January 12, 1998, this Office received information thatMonica Lewinsky was attempting to influence the testimony of oneof the witnesses in the Jones litigation, and that Ms. Lewinskyherself was prepared to provide false information under oath inthat lawsuit. The OIC was also informed that Ms. Lewinsky hadspoken to the President and the President's close friend VernonJordan about being subpoenaed to testify in the Jones suit, andthat Vernon Jordan and others were helping her find a job. Theallegations with respect to Mr. Jordan and the job search weresimilar to ones already under review in the ongoing Whitewaterinvestigation.⁽⁹⁾

After gathering preliminary evidence to test theinformation's reliability, the OIC presented the evidence toAttorney General Janet Reno. Based on her review of theinformation, the Attorney General determined that a furtherinvestigation by the Independent Counsel was required.

On the following day, Attorney General Reno petitioned theSpecial Division of the United States Court of Appeals for theDistrict of Columbia Circuit, on an expedited basis, to expandthe jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr. OnJanuary 16, 1998, in response to the Attorney General's request,the Special Division issued an order that provides in pertinentpart:

The Independent Counsel shall have jurisdiction andauthority to investigate to the maximum extent authorized bythe Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994 whetherMonica Lewinsky or others suborned perjury, obstructedjustice, intimidated witnesses, or otherwise violatedfederal law other than a Class B or C misdemeanor orinfraction in dealing with witnesses, potential witnesses,attorneys, or others concerning the civil case Jones v.Clinton.⁽¹⁰⁾

On January 28, 1998, after the allegations about thePresident's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky became public, the OICfiled a Motion for Limited Intervention and a Stay of Discoveryin Jones v. Clinton. The OIC argued that the civil discoveryprocess should be halted because it was having a negative effecton the criminal investigation. The OIC represented to the Courtthat numerous individuals then under subpoena in Jones, includingMonica Lewinsky, were integral to the OIC's investigation, andthat courts routinely stayed discovery in such circumstances.⁽¹¹⁾

The next day Judge Wright responded to the OIC's motion. The Court ruled that discovery would be permitted to continue,except to the extent that it sought information about MonicaLewinsky. The Court acknowledged that "evidence concerningMonica Lewinsky might be relevant to the issues in [the Jones]case."⁽¹²⁾ It concluded, however, that this evidence was not"essential to the core issues in this case," and that some ofthat evidence "might even be inadmissible."⁽¹³⁾ The Court foundthat the potential value of this evidence was outweighed by thepotential delay to the Jones case in continuing to seek discoveryabout Ms. Lewinsky.⁽¹⁴⁾ The Court also was concerned that theOIC's investigation "could be impaired and prejudiced were theCourt to permit inquiry into the Lewinsky matter by the partiesin this civil case."⁽¹⁵⁾

On March 9, 1998, Judge Wright denied Ms. Jones's motion forreconsideration of the decision regarding Monica Lewinsky. Theorder states:

The Court readily acknowledges that evidence of the Lewinskymatter might have been relevant to plaintiff's case and, asshe argues, that such evidence might possibly have helpedher establish, among other things, intent, absence ofmistake, motive, and habit on the part of the President. .. . Nevertheless, whatever relevance such evidence mayotherwise have . . . it simply is not essential to the coreissues in this case . . . .⁽¹⁶⁾

On April 1, 1998, Judge Wright granted President Clinton'smotion for summary judgment, concluding that even if the factsalleged by Paula Jones were true, her claims failed as a matterof law.⁽¹⁷⁾ Ms. Jones has filed an appeal, and as of the date ofthis Referral, the matter remains under consideration by theUnited States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

After the dismissal of Ms. Jones's lawsuit, the criminalinvestigation continued. It was (and is) the view of this Officethat any attempt to obstruct the proper functioning of thejudicial system, regardless of the perceived merits of theunderlying case, is a serious matter that warrants furtherinquiry. After careful consideration of all the evidence, theOIC has concluded that the evidence of wrongdoing is substantialand credible, and that the wrongdoing is of sufficient gravitythat it warrants referral to Congress.⁽¹⁸⁾

It is not the role of this Office to determine whether thePresident's actions warrant impeachment by the House and removalby the Senate; those judgments are, of course, constitutionallyentrusted to the legislative branch.⁽¹⁹⁾ This Office isauthorized, rather, to conduct criminal investigations and toseek criminal prosecutions for matters within its jurisdiction.⁽²⁰⁾ In carrying out its investigation, however, this Office also hasa statutory duty to disclose to Congress information that "mayconstitute grounds for an impeachment," a task that inevitablyrequires judgment about the seriousness of the acts revealed bythe evidence.

From the beginning, this phase of the OIC's investigationhas been criticized as an improper inquiry into the President'spersonal behavior; indeed, the President himself suggested thatspecific inquiries into his conduct were part of an effort to"criminalize my private life."⁽²¹⁾ The regrettable fact that theinvestigation has often required witnesses to discuss sensitivepersonal matters has fueled this perception.

All Americans, including the President, are entitled toenjoy a private family life, free from public or governmentalscrutiny. But the privacy concerns raised in this case aresubject to limits, three of which we briefly set forth here.

First. The first limit was imposed when the President wassued in federal court for alleged sexual harassment. Theevidence in such litigation is often personal. At times, thatevidence is highly embarrassing for both plaintiff and defendant. As Judge Wright noted at the President's January 1998 deposition,"I have never had a sexual harassment case where there was notsome embarrassment."⁽²²⁾ Nevertheless, Congress and the SupremeCourt have concluded that embarrassment-related concerns mustgive way to the greater interest in allowing aggrieved parties topursue their claims. Courts have long recognized thedifficulties of proving sexual harassment in the workplace,inasmuch as improper or unlawful behavior often takes place inprivate.⁽²³⁾ To excuse a party who lied or concealed evidence onthe ground that the evidence covered only "personal" or "private"behavior would frustrate the goals that Congress and the courtshave sought to achieve in enacting and interpreting the Nation'ssexual harassment laws. That is particularly true when theconduct that is being concealed -- sexual relations in theworkplace between a high official and a young subordinateemployee -- itself conflicts with those goals.

Second. The second limit was imposed when Judge Wrightrequired disclosure of the precise information that is in partthe subject of this Referral. A federal judge specificallyordered the President, on more than one occasion, to provide therequested information about relationships with other women,including Monica Lewinsky. The fact that Judge Wright laterdetermined that the evidence would not be admissible at trial,and still later granted judgment in the President's favor, doesnot change the President's legal duty at the time he testified. Like every litigant, the President was entitled to object to thediscovery questions, and to seek guidance from the court if hethought those questions were improper. But having failed toconvince the court that his objections were well founded, thePresident was duty bound to testify truthfully and fully. Perjury and attempts to obstruct the gathering of evidence cannever be an acceptable response to a court order, regardless ofthe eventual course or outcome of the litigation.

The Supreme Court has spoken forcefully about perjury andother forms of obstruction of justice:

In this constitutional process of securing a witness'testimony, perjury simply has no place whatever. Perjuredtestimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basicconcepts of judicial proceedings. Effective restraintsagainst this type of egregious offense are thereforeimperative.⁽²⁴⁾

The insidious effects of perjury occur whether the case is civilor criminal. Only a few years ago, the Supreme Court considereda false statement made in a civil administrative proceeding: "False testimony in a formal proceeding is intolerable. We mustneither reward nor condone such a 'flagrant affront' to thetruth-seeking function of adversary proceedings. . . . Perjuryshould be severely sanctioned in appropriate cases."⁽²⁵⁾ Statedmore simply, "[p]erjury is an obstruction of justice."⁽²⁶⁾

Third. The third limit is unique to the President. "ThePresidency is more than an executive responsibility. It is theinspiring symbol of all that is highest in American purpose andideals."⁽²⁷⁾ When he took the Oath of Office in 1993 and again in1997, President Clinton swore that he would "faithfully executethe Office of President."⁽²⁸⁾ As the head of the Executive Branch,the President has the constitutional duty to "take Care that theLaws be faithfully executed."⁽²⁹⁾ The President gave his testimonyin the Jones case under oath and in the presence of a federaljudge, a member of a co-equal branch of government; he thentestified before a federal grand jury, a body of citizens who hadthemselves taken an oath to seek the truth. In view of theenormous trust and responsibility attendant to his high Office,the President has a manifest duty to ensure that his conduct atall times complies with the law of the land.

In sum, perjury and acts that obstruct justice by anycitizen -- whether in a criminal case, a grand juryinvestigation, a congressional hearing, a civil trial, or civildiscovery -- are profoundly serious matters. When such acts arecommitted by the President of the United States, we believe thoseacts "may constitute grounds for an impeachment."

1. Background of the Investigation. The link between theOIC's jurisdiction -- as it existed at the end of 1997 -- and thematters set forth in this Referral is complex but direct. InJanuary 1998, Linda Tripp, a witness in three ongoing OICinvestigations, came forward with allegations that: (i) MonicaLewinsky was planning to commit perjury in Jones v. Clinton, and(ii) she had asked Ms. Tripp to do the same. Ms. Tripp alsostated that: (i) Vernon Jordan had counseled Ms. Lewinsky andhelped her obtain legal representation in the Jones case, and(ii) at the same time, Mr. Jordan was helping Ms. Lewinsky obtainemployment in the private sector.

OIC investigators and prosecutors recognized parallelsbetween Mr. Jordan's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and hisearlier relationship with a pivotal Whitewater-Madison figure,Webster L. Hubbell. Prior to January 1998, the OIC possessedevidence that Vernon Jordan -- along with other high-levelassociates of the President and First Lady -- helped Mr. Hubbellobtain lucrative consulting contracts while he was a potentialwitness and/or subject in the OIC's ongoing investigation. Thisassistance took place, moreover, while Mr. Hubbell was a targetof a separate criminal investigation into his own conduct. TheOIC also possessed evidence that the President and the First Ladyknew and approved of the Hubbell-focused assistance.

Specifically, in the wake of his April 1994 resignation fromthe Justice Department, Mr. Hubbell launched a private consultingpractice in Washington, D.C. In the startup process, Mr. Hubbellreceived substantial aid from important public and privatefigures. On the day prior to Mr. Hubbell announcing hisresignation, White House Chief of Staff Thomas "Mack" McLartyattended a meeting at the White House with the President, FirstLady, and others, where Mr. Hubbell's resignation was a topic ofdiscussion.

At some point after the White House meeting, Mr. McLartyspoke with Vernon Jordan about Mr. Jordan's assistance toMr. Hubbell. Mr. Jordan introduced Mr. Hubbell to seniorexecutives at New York-based MacAndrews & Forbes Holding Co. Mr. Jordan is a director of Revlon, Inc., a company controlled byMacAndrews & Forbes. The introduction was successful; MacAndrews& Forbes retained Mr. Hubbell at a rate of $25,000 per quarter. Vernon Jordan informed President Clinton that he was helpingMr. Hubbell.⁽³¹⁾

By late 1997, this Office was investigating whether arelationship existed between consulting payments to Mr. Hubbelland his lack of cooperation (specifically, his incompletetestimony) with the OIC's investigation.⁽³²⁾ In particular, theOIC was investigating whether Mr. Hubbell concealed informationabout certain core Arkansas matters, namely, the much-publicizedCastle Grande real estate project and related legal work by theRose Law Firm, including the First Lady.

Against this background, the OIC considered the January 1998allegations that: (i) Ms. Lewinsky was prepared to lie in orderto benefit the President, and (ii) Vernon Jordan was assistingMs. Lewinsky in the Jones litigation, while simultaneouslyhelping her apply for a private-sector job with, among others,Revlon, Inc.

Based in part on these similarities, the OIC undertook apreliminary investigation. On January 15, 1998, this Officeinformed the Justice Department of the results of our inquiry. The Attorney General immediately applied to the Special Divisionof the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit foran expansion of the OIC's jurisdiction. The Special Divisiongranted this request and authorized the OIC to determine whetherMonica Lewinsky or others had violated federal law in connectionwith the Jones v. Clinton case.

2. Current Status of the Investigation. When the OIC'sjurisdiction was expanded to cover the Lewinsky matter in January1998, several matters remained under active investigation by thisOffice. Evidence was being gathered and evaluated on, amongother things, events related to the Rose Law Firm'srepresentation of Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association;events related to the firings in the White House Travel Office;and events related to the use of FBI files. Since the currentphase of the investigation began, additional events arising fromthe Lewinsky matter have also come under scrutiny, includingpossible perjury and obstruction of justice related to formerWhite House volunteer Kathleen Willey, and the possible misuse ofthe personnel records of Pentagon employee Linda Tripp.

From the outset, it was our strong desire to complete allphases of the investigation before deciding whether to submit toCongress information -- if any -- that may constitute grounds foran impeachment. But events and the statutory command of Section595(c) have dictated otherwise. As the investigation into thePresident's actions with respect to Ms. Lewinsky and the Joneslitigation progressed, it became apparent that there was asignificant body of substantial and credible information that metthe Section 595(c) threshold. As that phase of the investigationneared completion, it also became apparent that a delay of thisReferral until the evidence from all phases of the investigationhad been evaluated would be unwise. Although Section 595(c) doesnot specify when information must be submitted, its text stronglysuggests that information of this type belongs in the hands ofCongress as soon as the Independent Counsel determines that theinformation is reliable and substantially complete.

All phases of the investigation are now nearing completion. This Office will soon make final decisions about what steps totake, if any, with respect to the other information it hasgathered. Those decisions will be made at the earliest practicaltime, consistent with our statutory and ethical obligations.

The Contents of the Referral

The Referral consists of several parts. Part One is aNarrative. It begins with an overview of the informationrelevant to this investigation, then sets forth that informationin chronological sequence. A large part of the Narrative isdevoted to a description of the President's relationship withMonica Lewinsky. The nature of the relationship was the subjectof many of the President's false statements, and his desire tokeep the relationship secret provides a motive for many of hisactions that apparently were designed to obstruct justice.

The Narrative is lengthy and detailed. It is the view ofthis Office that the details are crucial to an informedevaluation of the testimony, the credibility of witnesses, andthe reliability of other evidence. Many of the details revealhighly personal information; many are sexually explicit. This isunfortunate, but it is essential. The President's defense tomany of the allegations is based on a close parsing of thedefinitions that were used to describe his conduct. We have,after careful review, identified no manner of providing theinformation that reveals the falsity of the President'sstatements other than to describe his conduct with precision.

Part Two of the Referral is entitled "Information that MayConstitute Grounds for An Impeachment." This "Grounds" portionof the Referral summarizes the specific evidence that thePresident lied under oath and attempted to obstruct justice. This Part is designed to be understandable if read without theNarrative, although the full context in which the potentialgrounds for impeachment arise can best be understood ifconsidered against the backdrop of information set forth in PartOne.

Several volumes accompany the Referral. The Appendixcontains relevant court orders, tables, a discussion of legal andevidentiary issues, background information on the Joneslitigation, a diagram of the Oval Office, and other referencematerial. We next set forth a series of "Document Supplements,"which attempt to provide some of the most important supportmaterial in an accessible format. Document Supplement A containstranscripts of the President's deposition testimony and grandjury testimony; Document Supplement B contains transcripts ofMonica Lewinsky's testimony and interview statements. DocumentSupplements C, D, and E set forth the full text of the documentscited in the Referral. Although every effort has been made toprovide full and accurate quotations of witnesses in their propercontext, we urge review of the full transcripts of the testimonycited below.

1. Section 595(c) of Title 28 of the United States Code ispart of the Ethics in Government Act. The section provides:

(c) Information relating to impeachment. -- Anindependent counsel shall advise the House ofRepresentatives of any substantial and credible informationwhich such independent counsel receives, in carrying out theindependent counsel's responsibilities under this chapter,that may constitute grounds for an impeachment. Nothing inthis chapter or section 49 of this title [concerning theassignment of judges to the Special Division that appointsan independent counsel] shall prevent the Congress or eitherHouse thereof from obtaining information in the course of animpeachment proceeding.

2. Ms. Jones also named Arkansas State Trooper DannyFerguson as a defendant. For a detailed background of the Jonesv. Clinton lawsuit, see the accompanying Appendix, Tab C.

3. In 1991, Ms. Jones was an employee of the ArkansasIndustrial Development Corporation. Ms. Jones alleged that whileat work at a meeting at the Excelsior Hotel that day, she wasinvited into a hotel room with Governor Clinton, and that onceshe was there, the Governor exposed his genitals and asked her toperform oral sex on him. Ms. Jones alleged that she sufferedvarious job detriments after refusing Governor Clinton'sadvances. This Referral expresses no view on the factual orlegal merit, or lack thereof, of Ms. Jones's claims.

4. Jones v. Clinton, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1652 (1997).

5. The purpose of discovery in a civil lawsuit is "to allowa broad search for facts, the names of witnesses, or any othermatters which may aid a party in the preparation or presentationof his case." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes(1946). The discovery process allows the parties to obtain fromtheir respective opponents written answers to interrogatories,oral testimony in depositions under oath, documents, and othertangible items so long as the information sought "appearsreasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissibleevidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

6. 921-DC-00000461 (Dec. 11, 1997 Order at 3). Similarly,in a December 18, 1997 Order, Judge Wright noted that "the issue[was] one of discovery, not admissibility of evidence at trial. Discovery, as all counsel know, by its very nature takesunforeseen twists and turns and goes down numerous paths, andwhether those paths lead to the discovery of admissible evidenceoften simply cannot be predetermined." 1414-DC-00001012-13 (Dec.18, 1997 Order at 7-8).

7. V002-DC-00000020 (President Clinton's Responses toPlaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories at 5).

8. V002-DC-00000053 (President Clinton's SupplementalResponses to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories at 2). During discovery in a civil lawsuit, the parties must answerwritten questions ("interrogatories") that are served on them bytheir opponent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33. The answering party mustsign a statement under penalty of perjury attesting to thetruthfulness of the answers. Id.

9. For a brief discussion of the scope of the OIC'sjurisdiction, see "The Scope of the Referral," below.

10. The full text of the Special Division's Order is setforth in the Appendix, Tab A.

11. Jones v. Clinton, Motion of the United States forLimited Intervention and a Stay of Discovery, at 6. The overlapin the proceedings was significant. Witnesses called before thegrand jury in the criminal investigation had been subpoenaed byboth parties to the civil case; defendant's counsel hadsubpoenaed information from the OIC; and the plaintiff'sattorneys had subpoenaed documents directly related to thecriminal matter.

12. Jones v. Clinton, Order, Jan. 29, 1998, at 2.

13. Id.

14. Id. at 2-3.

15. Id. at 3.

16. Jones v. Clinton, 993 F. Supp. 1217, 1222 (E.D. Ark.1998) (footnote and emphasis omitted).

17. Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 679 (E.D. Ark.1998).

18. In the course of its investigation, the OIC gatheredinformation from a variety of sources, including the testimony ofwitnesses before the grand jury. Normally a federal prosecutoris prohibited by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of CriminalProcedure from disclosing grand jury material, unless it obtainspermission from a court or is otherwise authorized by law to doso. This Office concluded that the statutory obligation ofdisclosure imposed on an Independent Counsel by 28 U.S.C. §595(c)grants such authority. Nevertheless, out of an abundance ofcaution, the OIC obtained permission from the Special Division todisclose grand jury material as appropriate in carrying out itsstatutory duty. A copy of the disclosure order entered by theSpecial Division is set forth in the Appendix, Tab B. We alsoadvised Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson, who supervises theprincipal grand jury in this matter, of our determination on thatissue.

19. U.S. Const., art. I, § 2, cl. 5; art. I, § 3, cl. 6.

20. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a).

21. Before the grand jury, the President refused to answercertain questions about his conduct with Ms. Lewinsky on theground that he believed the inquiries were unnecessary "and . . .I think, frankly, go too far in trying to criminalize my privatelife." Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 94.

Others have argued that alleged "lies about sex" havenothing to do with the President's performance in office, andthus, are inconsequential. Former White House Counsel Jack Quinnarticulated this view:

This is a matter of sex between consenting adults, and thequestion of whether or not one or the other was truthfulabout it. . . . This doesn't go to the question of hisconduct in office. And, in that sense, it's trivial.

John F. Harris, "In Political Washington, A ConfessionConsensus," Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1998, at A1 (quoting Quinn'sstatement on CBS's "Face the Nation").

The President echoed this theme in his address to the Nationon August 17, 1998, following his grand jury testimony:

. . . I intend to reclaim my family life for my family. It's nobody's business but ours. Even Presidents haveprivate lives. It is time to stop the pursuit of personaldestruction and the prying into private lives and get onwith our national life.

Testing of a President: In His Own Words, Last Night'sAddress, The New York Times, Aug. 18, 1998, at A12.

22. Clinton 1/17/98 Depo. at 9. As two commentators havenoted: "[T]o the extent that discovery is permitted with respectto the sexual activities of either the complainant or the allegedharasser, courts likely will freely entertain motions to limitthe availability of such information to the parties and theircounsel and to prohibit general dissemination of such sensitivedata to third parties." See Barbara Lindeman & David D. Kadue,Sexual Harassment in Employment Law 563 (1992).

23. A sexual harassment case can sometimes boil down to acredibility battle between the parties, in which "the existenceof corroborative evidence or the lack thereof is likely to becrucial." Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 912 n.25 (11thCir. 1982). If there are no eyewitnesses, it can be critical fora plaintiff to learn in discovery whether the defendant hascommitted the same kind of acts before or since. Thus, the EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission explained in a 1990 policystatement that the plaintiff's allegations of an incident ofsexual harassment "would be further buttressed if other employeestestified that the supervisor propositioned them as well." EEOCPolicy Guidance (1990). The rules of evidence establish thatsuch corroboration may be used to show the defendant's "motive,opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, orabsence of mistake or accident." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Inshort, a defendant's sexual history, at least with respect toother employees, is ordinarily discoverable in a sexualharassment suit.

24. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1975)(plurality opinion).

25. ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 323(1994).

26. United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937). There is occasional misunderstanding to the effect that perjuryis somehow distinct from "obstruction of justice." While thecrimes are distinct, they are in fact variations on a singletheme: preventing a court, the parties, and the public fromdiscovering the truth. Perjury, subornation of perjury,concealment of subpoenaed documents, and witness tampering areall forms of obstruction of justice.

27. See Eugene Lyons, Herbert Hoover: A Biography 337 (1964)(quoting Hoover).

28. U.S. Const., art. II, § 1, cl. 8.

29. U.S. Const., art. II, § 3; see also George Washington,Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1793:

Previous to the execution of any official act of thePresident the Constitution requires an oath of office. Thisoath I am now about to take, and in your presence: That ifit shall be found during my administration of the GovernmentI have in any instance violated willingly or knowingly theinjunctions thereof, I may (besides incurring constitutionalpunishment) be subject to the upbraidings of all who are nowwitnesses of the present solemn ceremony.

Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States, H.R.Doc. No. 82-540, at 4 (1954).

30. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,653-54 (Jackson, J., concurring).

31. Jordan, House Testimony, 7/24/97, at 46.

32. From April through November 1994, 17 different personsor entities retained Mr. Hubbell as a consultant. In 1994, hecollected $450,010 for this work. In 1995, he collected $91,750,despite beginning a 28-month prison term in August of that year.